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This paper is a part of my major research project on “Toward a Theory of How 
Customs, Tradition, and Moral Values Affect Social Stability and Economic 
Development.” I am grateful to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for 
financial support. Miroslav Prokopijevich read an earlier draft of this paper 
and made some important suggestions. An opportunity to participate in John 
Moore’s annual   conferences in Alpbach, Austria helped me to formulate my 
views on the transition process in Eastern Europe.  
1. THE (IM) MORALITY OF THE TRANSITION INDUSTRY 
The rejection of private property rights was the central premise of socialism 
from its earliest days, and the abolition of private property rights was the 
driving ideological force behind all socialist experiments in the twentieth 
century. The best examples of those institutional arrangements are the former 
Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. The Soviet type firm and the labor-
managed firm were not ad hoc models; indeed, they were the consequence of 
the basic philosophical and economic premises of the socialist doctrine as it 
has evolved since the eighteenth century. And they have both failed.  
The apologists of socialism argue that by pursuing their own ends, the 
political leaders in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union ruined the 
chance for socialism to prove itself as a viable alternative to the private-
property, free-market economy. The argument is plain wrong. The leaders did 
exactly what all of us are doing. They pursued their private ends; the 
economic outcome being determined by the system of incentives that 
socialist institutions generate. 
Today, the consequences of the socialist experiment, perhaps the costliest 
experiment in human history, are fading from our memories. For university 
students in the West, the socialist rule in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe is fast becoming an ancient history; something that could not possibly 
happen again. Young men and women are busy with their careers in 
competitive markets. Baby boomers in the United States are focusing on the 
value of  their retirement annuities. President Clinton has almost succeeded 
in socializing our health care. The European Community is creating a huge 
bureaucracy, which will eventually replace the freedom of choice in Western 
Europe with legislated outcomes. John Paul II has expressed some serious 
misgivings about the consequences of the free-market, private property 
economy. 
Memories are in the short supply in the East as well. In Russia and many 
East European countries pro-collectivist parties (communists, socialists, 
nationalists, etc.) are gaining votes. In Serbia and Bosnia people are talking 
about good old days under Tito. They forget that Tito’s “war of liberation” 
freed Yugoslavia from the German occupation not a day sooner than it would 
have happened anyhow. To seal his victory over the opponents of 
communism, Tito murdered in 1945 over 30,000 Croats, Serbs and Slovenes. 
In the early 1950s, Tito organized concentration camps that were as bad and 
probably worse than Stalin’s gulags. As late as in the 1970s, Tito conducted  
a major purge that condemned thousand of people in Serbia and Croatia to 
unemployment and jail sentences.  
The attitude of present-day socialists has been affected by two real world 
experiences: the failure of all socialist experiments to develop efficient 
enterprises, and the theoretical research and empirical evidence about the 
efficiency-enhancing consequences of the right of ownership. Those two real 
world experiences created strong (survival) incentives for socialists to rewrite 
the doctrine in a way that would make private property rights and socialism 
compatible. To accomplish that, they needed allies. And they found them in 
the West as well as in the East. 
Western scholars associated with Russian Centers, East European Centers, 
associations for comparative systems, and various industrial policy institutes 
discovered, practically overnight, that the demand for their “skills” was gone 
with the wind. To survive, they had to look for the ways to salvage their 
knowledge and training. In the East, universities were not de-communized 
(except in East Germany). After many decades of research and teaching 
about economic planning, East European professors had to do a complete 
turnaround and support free-market reforms. Leaving aside the morality of 
those people, the fact of life is that their human capital is not adeuate to help 
them understand and even less appreciate the economic forces at work in the 
private-property, free-market economy.  
I conjecture that the transition process, as we knew it in 1989-92, is long 
gone. Today, we witness the birth of a new rent-seeking coalition: the 
transition industry. It consists of the latter-day socialists, social engineers, 
bureaucrats, economists from the West and the East who are looking for 
programs that would reward their old skills, reformed and non-reformed 
communists, and others. The survival trait for this diverse group of rent-
seekers is to seek ever larger role for East European governments, to 
develop and impose legislated outcomes, and to deny that private property 
rights and individual liberty are superior to social engineering. To paraphrase 
Vaclav Klaus, “the muddle in the middle” is the quickest way to the third 
world. By failing to separate analysis from abstract valuations and beliefs 
(which occur in a cognitive limbo), the muddle in the middle offers no useful 
evidence for economic analysis. 
The purpose of this paper is to remind the political-scientific elite in Eastern 
Europe that the strong positive relationship between the private-property, 
free-market economy and economic development is not accidental. The more 
property rights in a good the person has, the closer is his private cost to the 
social cost of using that good. This relationship between private and social 
costs creates strong incentives for individuals to engage in activities that 
promote economic development. As they exploit those incentives, risk-takers 
capture the rewards. Socialist institutions create incentives that cannot 
duplicate the contribution to economic development that profit seeking 
individuals such as Gates, Ford, and Dell have been making.  
This paper will focus on two interrelated issues. First, it will discuss the 
economic advantages of privately owned firms. Next, the paper will 
emphasize the importance of keeping the state out of the process of choosing 
business organizations. 
2. WHY DO WE HAVE BUSINESS FIRMS? 
The firm is a group of people in teamwork. It is a set of contracts involving 
separately owned inputs whose value as a team exceeds the sum of the 
market values each member of the team could produce by contracting the 
use of his inputs across markets. Business firms exist because teamwork is 
an efficient method for organizing production. 
In a private-property, free-market society, we observe a number of different 
contractual agreements.  We can think of those contractual agreements as 
approximating a random selection, from which successes and failures are 
chosen. With bounded rationality and positive transaction costs, all 
contractual agreements producing positive gains (that is, the value of output 
in excess of the sum of the market values each member of the team could 
produce contracting across markets) are eligible for imitation. By imitating 
successful contracts, individuals create a selection process from which 
different types of privately owned business firms emerge. 
The privately owned firm is a set of contracts between the owners of 
cooperating inputs with one party who is central to all contracts. While the 
terms of contractual agreements among team members differ in some specific 
details from one firm to another, and especially from one type of business 
firms to another (e.g., corporations, codetermining firms, partnerships, 
mutuals, not-for-profit, cooperatives etc.), all privately owned firms have the 
same bundle of property rights. Those rights create their own incentives 
affecting economic behavior in specific and predictable ways. Three major 
property rights that define the privately owned firm are: 
The owner's right to appropriate the firm’s residual. This right creates 
incentives for the owner to pursue efficiency-enhancing behaviors, and to 
incur the costs of technological and managerial innovations. The owner's 
right to hire and fire members of the team. This right is essential in order to 
enforce incentives specified under the right number one. If  the owner had to 
satisfy criteria not related to the performance of members of the team, such 
as the affirmative action in the United States, the firm’s costs of production 
would be higher and marginal enterprises would not survive. The right to sell 
the preceding two rights. The transferability of assets is the most important 
component of the right of ownership. It provides individuals with a choice to 
take the value of their assets in a lump sum or as a flow over the life of those 
assets. 
The bundle of rights specified above has three behavioral consequences that 
set all the different types of privately owned firms apart from non-private 
enterprises. First, the owner’s right to capitalize the expected future returns 
into their market prices eliminates the time horizon problem; the flow of future 
benefits over the expected life of the firm being available to the owner in one 
lump sum. Second, the right of ownership allows the owner to make 
adjustments for his/her risk preferences. If I were risk averse I would sell the 
flow of income from my oil-well for a lump sum of money, and invest proceeds 
into government bonds. My risk-taking colleague can do just the opposite. No 
other types of property rights give individuals this type of choice. Finally, the 
bundle of rights creates strong incentives for the owner to seek the best use 
for the team’s resources. Those three consequences of private property 
rights explain why privately owned firms have outcompeted all other types of 
enterprises.  
4. THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL STRUCTURES OF BUSINESS FIRMS 
Let us now turn to the question: what do academic research and empirical 
evidence have to say about governance structures and different types of 
privately owned firms?  
4..1. The Choice of Governance Structures 
We know that the survival of business firms depends on their success in 
producing the market value that exceeds the sum of the market values each 
member of the team could produce by contracting the use of his inputs across 
markets. The source of the gains from teamwork is incentives arising from the 
contents and terms of contractual agreements among members of the team. 
Thus the governance structure of business firms matter.  
There is a tendency in Eastern Europe to pass laws specifying governance 
structures. The problem with that tendency is that fixed rules freeze 
governance structures into a rigid system. They substitute preferences of the 
ruling elite and social engineers for the agreements between equity owners, 
potential investors, senior executives, the employees, and all other members 
of the team who know their own preferences, bear the risk of their choices, 
and are directly affected by the firm’s performance.  
On the other hand, the freedom of contract allows members of the team to 
choose what kind of firm they want to have (corporation, partnership, mutuals, 
cooperatives, etc.); to decide whether they want a centralized or 
decentralized firm, inside or outside directors, a strong CEO or a strong 
board; to choose the method of rewarding performance (stock options, cash 
bonuses, premium over market wages, non-cash benefits such as long 
holidays, etc.); and to specify trade-offs between profit and other objectives 
(as the York Times and the Wall Street Journal have done). 
For example, in a large manufacturing firm in Dallas, four out of thirteen 
members of the board are former employees (“inside” directors). Two 
members of the board are current employees (chairman of the board and the 
president) of the Company. Remaining seven members of the board are 
“outside” directors selected for their accomplishments in finance, business 
and academics. As a condition of their tenure on the board, “inside” directors 
must seek membership on the board of other firms.  
All the different governing structures that we observe in the United States 
have emerged through voluntary contractual agreements and passed the 
market (survival) test. The survival of alternative governance structures is the 
best evidence that no two firms are alike. Professor Andrews wrote that some 
boards specialize in handling crises, others produce CEOs from among their 
members, some boards are minutely interested in day-by-day operations, 
while others prefer to remain more detached. But, no single model can 
specify the interrelation of functions. 
To justify a set of fixed rules about governance structures by saying that they 
reflect the evolving trend is plain wrong. No firm needs the law in order to 
adapt to emerging practices. And many firms need to be free to deviate from 
the trend. Analysis and empirical observations suggest that the best way to 
go is to let members of the team develop governance structures in 
accordance with their judgment of their survival needs. 
4.2. Industrial Democracy by Fiat Is a Wrong Choice 
Industrial democracy is an umbrella for all the different forms of labor 
participation in the governance of business firms. Evidence shows that 
industrial democracy has not emerged voluntarily on any significant scale and 
has failed to perform successfully whenever and wherever imposed by fiat. 
Yet, the demand for labor participation in the governance of business firms 
continues to be relatively strong. The reason is quite simple: industrial 
democracy offers too many rent-seeking opportunities, and satisfies too many 
ideological preferences to be discarded on account of its poor performance. 
Whatever the facade of words, terms such as industrial democracy, 
stakeholding, or labor participation are code words for wealth transfers. 
Involuntary labor participation in the governance of business firms restricts 
the freedom of individuals to negotiate mutually beneficial organizational 
forms. An implication is that by increasing the risk borne by equity holders, 
involuntary labor participation in the governance of business firms raises the 
cost of equity capital. When the shareholders invest their wealth into an 
investment project that turns out to be successful, they share the gains with 
labor. When the investment decision is not successful, shareholders alone 
bear the losses. Employees experience no loss of wealth; their cost is limited 
to the cost of changing jobs.  
All the different forms of involuntary industrial democracy have one common 
effect: Labor participation in the governance of enterprises attenuates the 
right of ownership and, consequently, increases the gap between private and 
social costs of using scarce goods. The fact that labor participation in 
governance has to be mandated by the government and protected from 
competition is the best evidence of its inefficiency.  
If labor participation had positive effects on the firm's productivity, why don't 
we observe the labor participatory firm on a significant scale? Why don't 
shareholders negotiate with employees a contract that would make both 
groups better off? If labor participation has to be mandated by law, how can 
we assert that it is a superior method for organizing production? There is no 
law in the United States that says that there shall be no labor participation. 
Indeed, there are cases in which labor participation has emerged voluntarily, 
but it has not happened on any significant scale. 
Germany is a good case for analysis of the consequences of involuntary 
labor participation in the governance of business enterprises. The 
Codetermination Act of 1976 in Germany—a capitalist version of the labor-
managed firm--applies to all business firms that have more than 2,000 
employees. The supervisory council (i.e., the board of directors) for such 
firms has twelve members, of whom six are representatives of the 
shareholders and six are representatives of the employees. The chairman of 
the supervisory council is elected by the shareholders and holds the deciding 
vote in case of a deadlock.  
Empirical evidence is simply not consistent with the claim that 
codetermination bestows benefits on workers without any detrimental effects 
on other members of the team. Immediately after the passage of the 
Codetermination Act of 1976, many business firms tried to escape the parity 
representation on the supervisory board through mergers, reorganizations, 
moving their headquarters abroad, and other structural changes. In the late 
1970s, codetermination applied to about 650 firms. By the early 1980s 
codetermination covered only about 480 firms. About 120 firms had reduced 
their labor force below the 2,000 limit, while about 50 firms had changed their 
corporate charters. Assuming that both the size and contractual forms of 
those 170 firms reflected efficient business decisions, the post-1976 
adjustments are a social cost of codetermination.  
Jensen and Meckling summarized the economic effects of involuntary 
constraints on the freedom of contract in the following passage: 
Indeed, labor can start, and in rare cases has started firms of its own. 
Moreover, firms are free to write any kind of contracts they wish with their 
employees. If they choose to, they can offer no-dismissal no lay-off contracts 
(tenure at universities). If they choose to, they can establish worker councils 
and agree not to change production methods without worker approval. 
Moreover, employers would [encourage] such practices if the benefits 
exceeded the costs. Furthermore, if laborers value the security and "self-
realization" which such participatory arrangements afford them at more than 
their costs to the employer, they are in a position to offer voluntary changes, 
which it will pay the employer to take. ...Since those arrangements are [rarely] 
observed, we infer that workers do not value the security, management 
participation, etc. at more than the cost of providing them [emphasis mine].  
4.3. The Corporate Firm Has Emerged Spontaneously  
In the United States, we observe a large number of different types of 
business firms such as single proprietorships, partnerships, corporations, 
mutuals, not-for-profit firms, cooperatives, etc. All those firms have emerged 
through voluntary contractual agreements and survived competition from 
other types of firms; that is, law mandated none of those types of business 
firms. They reflect the freedom of individuals to write any kind of contract they 
wish with each other and bear the costs (risk) of their choice.  
The corporate firm is a product of this competitive environment. It has 
emerged spontaneously and survived competition from other methods of 
organizing production. The corporate firm is the best example of the wealth-
creating consequences of the private-property, free-market economy. The 
advantages of the corporate firm over other types of private ownership firms 
arise from: the rule of limited liability, the dispersion of shareholding, and the 
market for corporate control. Let us briefly describe each of them. 
The Law of Limited Liability.  Mass production of goods, production of durable 
goods, production of heavy machinery, the implementation of new 
technologies, innovations, and many other investments and commercial 
activities require pulling together large amounts of capital. Banks could not 
satisfy this huge demand for capital without driving interest rates to a level at 
which many opportunities for economic growth would fail to be exploited. We 
have enough research and empirical evidence to know that the state can 
neither raise voluntarily large amounts of capital nor be trusted with the 
allocation of investable funds. Except in frictionless blackboard models, state 
ownership provides strong incentives for the allocation of resources to by-
pass the market test.  
In response to economic pressures from within the system, numerous 
contractual agreements were tried in order to resolve the need for pulling 
together large amounts of capital. Eventually a new legal concept evolved: 
the rule of limited liability. This law limited each owner's (i.e., equity 
investor’s) liability to the market value of his investment in the firm, which 
created incentives for equity investments to be divided into small shares and 
traded in financial markets. By breaking up equity interests into relatively 
small shares, corporate firms were able to attract funds from small savers. 
This advantage derives from the anonymous alienability of shares, which 
enables shareholders to sell their shares without requiring the approval of 
other shareholders. By contributing to a substantial reduction in the 
transaction costs of raising large amounts of investable funds, the rule of 
limited liability made the corporate firm the most effective method of 
voluntarily gathering large amounts of capital for long-lived ventures.   
The Separation Thesis. Starting with the dispersion of shareholding, which is 
a fact of life, A. Berle and G. Means developed the separation of ownership 
and control thesis. The separation thesis quickly acquired a strong following 
among the critics of capitalism, who routinely ignore the difference between 
one’s desires and the reality of market processes. Branko Horvatxe 
"Horvat" from Croatia and Mihailo Markovichxe "Markovich" from Serbia, 
applied the separation thesis to their own vision of the world. Some decades 
ago they blamed private ownership for transforming humanity into a horde of 
profit-seeking beasts. Today, they argue that there is no need to encourage 
the development of private-ownership firms because the dispersion of 
shareholding has already socialized private property rights in business firms.  
The separation thesis basically says the following: The dispersion of 
shareholding insulates the management from the owners. Thus, the right of 
ownership is empty because the shareholders have no control over the use of 
their resources. Managers control resources, make decisions affecting 
shareholders’ wealth, and can easily protect themselves by soliciting proxies 
at the company’s expense. The bottom line is that the dispersion of 
shareholding leads to (1) withering away of private property rights in the 
corporate firm, (2) the transfer of a part of the residual (i.e. shareholders’ 
wealth) to managers, and (3) a reduced flow of capital into business firms 
with dispersed ownership.   
Empirical observations are consistent with neither of these two outcomes. 
The fact is that millions of individuals continue to invest in common stock. 
Why do they not choose other investment opportunities that exist in the 
United States? Why is equity financing not being driven out by investments in 
fixed claims? Why do we not observe a lower bid price for stocks of 
corporations with dispersed ownership relative to those firms that have less 
dispersed ownership? Why do dispersed ownership corporations not have 
lower rates of growth of shareholders' wealth?   
The Benefits of the Dispersion of Shareholding. The dispersion of 
shareholding is, in fact, an important source of the efficiency of corporate 
firms. 
1. There is no law in the United States that says that people have to buy 
shares in corporate firms. It is their choice. And they have many other 
alternatives for their savings. Thus, when people buy shares they voluntarily 
separate themselves from controlling their property. And for a good reason. 
Those who buy shares in corporate firms choose to specialize in bearing the 
risks. Managers are individuals who specialize in managing the risk. The 
dispersion of shareholding is then fully consistent with the law of comparative 
advantage. 
2. In the United States, even small savers can diversify their investment 
portfolios and avoid the firm-specific risks. The separation thesis then “leads 
to lower capital costs for firms in the economy, and to greeter innovation, as 
shareholders are capable of investing in riskier ventures due to their ability to 
mitigate such risk through diversification.” 
3. The fact that shareholders have incentives to include innovative ventures 
into their portfolios means that the dispersion of shareholding is a source of 
capital for small start-up companies. 
4.  The diffusion of ownership provides the funds required for economic 
growth without a concentration of economic power within a society. An 
alternative is a concentration of share ownership in the hands of  the state or 
state protected rent seeking coalitions, which means a concentration of 
economic and political power within a society.  
5. The separation thesis contributes to the development of a large middle 
class with significant and diversifiable stakes in the economy. Highly 
competitive money managers who quickly punish non-performing firms by 
selling their shares in financial markets represent this group, which includes 
millions of retirees. 
The Costs of the Dispersion of Shareholding. Berle and Means were right in 
saying that the dispersion of shareholding has its costs. But, the fact that the 
corporate firm has continued to prosper could only mean that the benefits of 
the dispersion of shareholding exceed its costs. Let us now identify those 
costs and the circumstances upon which they depend. 
Major costs of the dispersion of shareholding are the transaction costs of 
monitoring managerial decisions that affect shareholders’ wealth, and the 
costs of hiring and firing corporate managers. Given their estimate of 
transaction costs, corporate managers should then be able to transfer some 
wealth from shareholders to themselves. They can do that in a variety of 
ways such as liberal expense accounts, plush offices, company planes, large 
number of beautiful (but not necessarily efficient) secretaries and 
receptionists, pleasant co-workers, opportunities to contribute to the causes 
they believe in, and so on. The consumption of those goods increases 
managers’ total income over and above their contractual pay, and is 
conveniently reported as the cost of doing business. 
An observable implication of the separation thesis should then be a negative 
relationship between the dispersion of shareholding and the shareholders’ 
gains in wealth; or--the same thing--a lower bid price for stocks of corporation 
with dispersed ownership. However, academic research and empirical 
evidence have demonstrated that no statistically significant relationship exists 
between the dispersion of shareholding and the shareholders’ gains in 
wealth. An implication is that the private-property free-market economy 
creates incentives to reduce the costs of the dispersion of shareholding. 
How? 
1. In competitive (i.e., non-regulated) financial markets, market valuation of 
the expected future consequences of current decisions by corporate 
managers raises their costs of making decisions that are contrary to the 
interests of shareholders. With bounded rationality and positive transaction 
costs, market evaluations of the future consequences of current decisions are 
often wrong and are continuously modified. However, the critical factor 
protecting  shareholders is that the (top) manager knows that his decisions 
are immediately scrutinized in financial markets, and that market valuations of 
the expected effects of those decisions on the profitability of his firms are 
quickly incorporated into stock prices. That is, financial markets raise the 
manager’s costs of pursuing activities that deviate from the profit-seeking 
behavior or--the same thing--guard the shareholders’ wealth. 
2. The opportunity costs of corporate managers depend on the profitability of 
business firms they manage. That is, the present value of a manager’s future 
earnings depends on the current profitability of his firm. An implication is that 
the pursuits of objectives other than the shareholders’ wealth are costly in 
terms of the manager’s future marketability. The consumption of 
nonpecuniary goods at the expense of potential profits has to appear to the 
manager as a choice between more utility now or more income tomorrow. 
3. Hostile takeovers are the most effective mechanism by which the market 
for corporate control assures shareholders that their wealth is well guarded. 
By disciplining corporate managers, hostile takeovers have increased the 
operating efficiency of corporations, their employee productivity, and their 
shareholder value. Macey wrote: The threat of a takeover creates a positive 
externality as managers of all firms, even those that are not subject to an 
outside bid, have incentives to maximize share value in order to reduce the 
arbitrage possibility for outside bidders, and thereby retain their posts.”  
5. CONCLUSION 
Credible and stable private property rights have to precede the choice of 
business firms. Then and only then the choice of business firms can make a 
difference. But it is naive at best and dangerous at worst to assume that 
changes in property rights could happen simply because it is obvious that the 
prevailing rules are bad or because some people come up with a better set of 
institutions or both. The transition industry and its rent-seeking cohorts derive 
benefits from the prevailing rules and will defend them whether those rules 
are good or bad. To change property rights, some people have to perceive 
that their benefits from institutional reforms are worth their costs of taking on 
the establishment. 
The smugglers in Montenegro are a good example of the group of people 
who might help to create more efficient property rights. It is not necessary to 
defend the morality of smuggling in Montenegro. Smuggling is a predictable 
and desirable consequence of the prevailing property relations in 
Milosevich’s Yugoslavia. It seems that president Djukanovich understands 
that. By refusing to enforce anti-smuggling measures, Djukanovich has 
reduced the transaction costs of smuggling, and made the benefits of black 
markets widely available to Montenegrins. Montenegrins are better off than 
they would have been if their president raised the transaction costs of black 
market activities. I  conjecture that smuggling in Montenegro might have two 
consequences: 
1. Smugglers are profit maximizers in a competitive environment (cartel–like 
agreements have a very short life expectancy in all markets where monitoring 
costs are high). It means that in order to survive, smugglers must seek 
contractual agreements that will pass the market test. Those agreements that 
prove viable will be imitated by other smugglers as well as non-smugglers, 
and eventually institutionalized into the rules of the game. In that sense, 
black market activities tend to reduce the transaction costs of making self-
sustaining changes in property rights in Montenegro, or--the same thing--
smugglers have a chance of  privatizing the process of institutional reforms in 
Montenegro. 
2. Pursuing its private ends, the ruling elite in Serbia (the same goes for 
Croatia and Bosnia) has exploited the old myths in order to create internal 
ethnic conflicts. Like all competitive markets, smuggling is color, ethnic, and 
religion blind; performance being the only discriminating (surviving) criterion. 
Evidence shows that smuggling in Montenegro has generated a degree of 
cooperation between ethnic groups that has not been observed in the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991. 
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